The Pakistan Movement

The Pakistan Movement, also known as Tehrik-e-Pakistan, was a political movement in the early 20th century that aimed to create a separate state for Muslims in the Indian subcontinent. This movement was rooted in the two-nation theory, which argued that Muslims and Hindus were distinct nations with their own customs, religion, and traditions, and therefore, Muslims should have their own separate state.

The word 'Pakistan' was coined by some Muslim students of Cambridge, led by Chaudhary Rahmat Ali in the early 1930s. Comprising Punjab, Afghan, Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan (Pakistan), they wanted to create a separate Muslim state in north-west India, which had a Muslim majority. Important Muslim leaders, including Mohammad Ali Jinnah, not only ignored but even opposed this idea. Jinnah, until the mid-1930s, was regarded as both a nationalist and secularist, and Sarojini Naidu even called him the 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity'.

The Pakistan Movement was based on the two-nation ideology, i.e., Hindus and Muslims were considered to be two nations as their political, economic, social, and cultural interests were not only different but even clashed with each other. The ideologues of the two-nation theory believed that the only way to protect the interests of the two 'nations' (Hindu nation or Muslim nation) was to make each a sovereign entity in itself, separate from the other. Some historians hold Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, some Sir Mohammad Iqbal (the great Persian-Urdu poet), and some V.D. Savarkar (leader of the Hindu Mahasabha) responsible for devising the two-nation theory. But it is not fair to blame any individual for the birth of such a complex ideology. It would be an exaggeration if someone tried to find the root cause of the Pakistan Movement in Sir Syed or Iqbal. In fact, until 1937, Muslim League politics was based on certain safeguards for Muslims in general and for Muslims of some specific provinces in particular. To find the root cause of the Pakistan Movement, the political events that followed the 1937 election were more crucial.

The Congress took both the Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha lightly. Till 1938, a member of the Muslim League or Hindu Mahasabha could also be a member of Congress. Maulana Azad observed that, after the Nehru Committee Report controversy and Jinnah's fourteen-point demand, the Muslim League members stopped attending Congress meetings, but the Sabhaites continued to do so. The refusal of Congress to form a joint government in U.P. led to a disaster. The Muslim League became more aggressive and propagandist during the 27-month rule of Congress. After the resignation of Congress in October 1939, the Muslim League celebrated the Day of Deliverance. One can blame the Muslim League for politicizing the failure of the Congress regime, but cannot deny that the series of communal riots alienated a vast section of Muslims, especially educated middle-class Muslims, and strengthened the influence of the Muslim League. Even the liberal and secular Muslims like Asaf Ali felt the pain. He wrote in early 1935 that when he went to Indore to defend the case of an accused, he found the Muslims in terror and demoralized owing to indiscriminate arrests and the rule of terror. He heard that the Arya Samajists and Sabhaites were active in the city. He even mentioned the biased notification of the Home Ministry number 16, dated March 10, 1927, to constitute a special tribunal to try the riot cases with two Hindu and one Muslim member, and the decision of the tribunal, based on the majority opinion, would be final (Asaf Ali Papers, 1621-1638; Vol. 9, Prem Chand Archives and Literary Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia).

In 1939, the Muslim League discussed some options like the Aligarh plan, prepared by Zafrul Hasan and Husain Qadri to divide India into four independent states: Hindustan, Pakistan, Bengal, and Hyderabad. Sikandar Hayat Khan of the Unionist Party proposed seven autonomous regions with limited powers to the centre, like defence, foreign affairs, customs, and currency. Obviously, the Government of the day was backing these plans. Finally, the historic moment came on March 23, 1940, at Lahore when the Muslim League adopted the resolution for a separate nation—Pakistan. The resolution was drafted by Sikander Hayat Khan, presented by Fazl-ul-Haque, and seconded by Khaliq-uz-Zaman. The wording of the resolution was drafted cleverly. It did not mention partition or the word 'Pakistan,' but it did talk about autonomous and sovereign units of Muslim-majority provinces in the north-west and in the east. The resolution, perhaps, also meant a weak centre with powerful provinces. In her book, Jinnah: The Sole Spokesman, the Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal has argued that the demand for Pakistan was used to bargain for maximum political concessions for Muslims in India. Tej Bahadur Sapru, on the other hand, remarked, "He (Jinnah) is like Oliver Twist. The more you give him, the more he wants." (Sapru Papers, Roll 1)

Both the British Government and the Congress party were responsible for increasing the sway of the Muslim League and pushing India towards partition. The Cripps Offer made in March 1942 provided a clever backdoor entry into Pakistan through provincial self-determination. It declared that the elected members of the Lower House would elect a constitution-making body by proportional representation. This constitution would be accepted by the British, but any province unwilling to accept the new constitution had the right to secede and frame its own constitution. Even Gandhi, in July 1944, conceded the right of self-determination to the Muslim-majority provinces (Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, pp. 208, Sage Publications, 2000). C. Rajagopalachari, a prominent Congress leader, formulated a plan, better known as the 'Rajaji Plan,' which envisaged a plebiscite in contiguous Muslim-majority districts in North-west and East India after the war and on the condition that the League would participate in an interim government, to decide on separation from India. Jinnah, on the other hand, insisted that only Muslims would decide whether an area was to be separated from India, and that all six provinces and not the districts alone would make up Pakistan. He insisted that before independence itself, Pakistan must be created. The manner in which Lord Wavell called off the 'Simla Conference' further substantiated the position of the Muslim League.

The election for the central and provincial legislative assemblies, in the winter of 1945-46, gave another opportunity to the Muslim League to set their house in order. Till then, its organisation was very poor and its social base was limited, but in 1945, the League reached out to the villagers, mainly the peasants, and it was now much better organised. The inherent class conflict between peasants and the Zamindars was given a communal colour. The Muslim League propagated among the Muslim peasants of Bengal and Punjab that in Pakistan they would be free from the exploitation of Hindu Zamindars and traders. The League succeeded in convincing the petty Muslim traders that they would get better opportunities to progress. The educated Muslim middle class was promised a better opportunity to rise and that their life, honour, and religion would be safe from the Hindus. In April 1945, the Federation of Muslim Chambers of Commerce and Industry was formed, and it was also planned that a Muslim Bank and Airlines Company would be opened after the war. Jinnah favoured these organisations. The League used the services of Ulema (Muslim theologians) for propaganda, and a vote for the League was termed as a vote for the Koran, and a vote for Congress as a vote for the Gita. Nationalist and liberal Muslims were ridiculed, abused, and threatened. Shah Ozair Momini, the candidate from Islampur, Purnea, was so 'afraid of being assaulted by the Leaguers that he tried to avoid appearing before the public and lost the election (Rajendra Prasad Papers, 9-R/45-46, Col. I). The League also propagated among the Muslim voters that if they did not support the League, they would cease to be Muslims, their marriages would be invalid, and their dead would not be allowed to be buried in Muslim graveyards. Khooni mushairas were held by the members of the League in the election campaign, as recorded by Mohammad Yunus, a Congress leader from the NWFP. Thus, the stereotyped slogan 'Islam in danger' was the flavour of the election campaign of the Muslim League. Obviously, the result was completely in favour of the League. It won all the Muslim seats in the Central Legislative Assembly elections, winning 89 per cent of the Muslim vote. Its all-India figures for provincial legislative assemblies were also impressive as it won 428 of the 492 Muslim seats. Ayesha Jalal, however, gave different reasons for the success of the League: "Jinnah's success at the polls in 1946 owed a great deal to the reluctance of the British to tell the voters what Pakistan entailed; it owed almost as much to Congress, which failed to rally its potential Muslim allies in provinces outside the League's sway." She further argues that the networks of patronage of the local Muslim leaders led to the success of the League at the hustings (Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, OUP, pp. 135, 147, 150).

Although the election result brought a smile to the Muslim League's face, yet Pakistan was still a dream, and without the support of the British, the formation of Pakistan was virtually impossible. The British Government sent a three-member Cabinet Mission in early 1946, which announced its plan on May 16, 1946. The plan avoided any reference to Pakistan, yet it proposed to construct a three-tiered federal structure which would ensure the autonomy of Muslim-majority provinces. A sovereign Pakistan was ruled out, which brought some relief to the Congress, but this was very short-lived, as the interpretation of grouping provisions in the Cabinet Mission Plan kept the possibility of Pakistan alive. In the month of August 1946, the League was in a militant mood, and on August 16, 1946—declared as Direct Action Day, the meaning of which was never defined and the cadres were free to interpret the way they wished—widespread communal violence spread in north and east India, especially in Calcutta and in many parts of Bihar, killing thousands of people. The Chief Minister of Bengal (a Muslim) and the Chief Minister of Bihar (a Hindu) remained mere spectators, if not actively abetting the rioting. Gandhi was quick to grasp the situation when he said, "We are not yet in the midst of civil war, but we are nearing it. At present, we are playing at it." (Harijan, 15 September 1946, MGCW, vol. 3, p. 177). But he decided to remain silent, "Very often silence is the most effective communication because silence is filled with truth." (Prayer meeting, New Delhi, August 28, 1946, MGCW, vol. 85, pp. 22). Jinnah, to be fair with him, did condemn the violence in Calcutta and promised action against Leaguers found guilty of disobeying instructions. Ayesha Jalal wrote that the violence was sparked off not by any League statements but by the Muslim clergy, and quite naturally, once the movement had begun, Jinnah could not direct or control it, but he could see the division of India as the only alternative and declared that India was on the brink of civil war. Muslims were no longer trusting Hindu leaders of the Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi, who himself was aware of this, "He was now looked upon as Enemy No. 1, rather than a friend by the majority of the Muslim community in India." (Bose, My Days with Gandhi, pp. 140 and 152). The Muslims accused him of caring only for Hindus; else why did he make Noakhali his headquarters and not Bihar?

The Muslim League came further close to the goal of Pakistan with the formation of the interim government on September 2, 1946, based on the Cabinet Mission Plan. Initially, the League was interested in the formation of the interim government with Jinnah as head. Even Gandhi advised Congress leaders to accept Jinnah as Prime Minister so that he could become more responsible and stop insisting on partition. B.R. Nanda, in his book Mahatma Gandhi: A Biography, called it "one supreme gesture." But the Congress leaders dismissed it and even started ignoring Gandhi. Jawaharlal Nehru became Prime Minister, and the Muslim League boycotted the interim government. Due to persuasion by Lord Wavell, the League joined the interim government, but only as a strategy to support the Pakistan Movement. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, one of the ministers of the interim government representing the Muslim League, confirmed this by saying, "We are going into the interim government to get a foothold to fight for our cherished goal of Pakistan. The Interim Government is one of the fronts of the direct action campaign." Except for Liaquat Ali Khan, who became Finance Minister, the other League nominees were second-raters. The cream leaders were kept reserved for the Pakistan Movement. The purpose of joining the interim government was 'non-cooperation from within.' The Congress members had devised the strategy of informal meetings prior to official ones to arrive at a consensus and reduce the Viceroy to a figurehead. The League members refused to attend such meetings; they held separate meetings under the leadership of Liaquat Ali Khan. In such cases, the Viceroy happily resumed his role as arbiter. Even the budget prepared by Liaquat Ali Khan divided Congress and the League. The budget was anti-rich and anti-capitalist, and it imposed heavy taxes on them. The Congress found itself in a dilemma as it was neither in a position to oppose nor to openly support. Finally, Nehru and other Congress leaders were convinced that partition was the only solution; the Mountbatten Plan did the rest.